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Entrism – the infiltration of political organisations by competitors – is typically associated 
with Trotskyism. Large-scale Communist entrism in the British Labour Party has been 
neglected by historians and reference in the literature is slight and impressionistic. Archival 
material permits reconstruction of a sustained attempt by the Comintern and British 
Communists to subvert Labour Party policy between 1933 and 1943. Documenting the 
development and dimensions of Communist entrism, this article establishes that, by 1937, 10 
per cent of Communist Party (CPGB) members were operating secretly inside British Labour, 
campaigning to change its policy on affiliation and engineer a popular front. Biographies of 
fifty-five such Communists provide new data and permit a typology of entrist activity. The 
episode sheds new light on popular front initiatives and the extent of genuine support for them 
within Labour. It illuminates the conspiratorial side of Stalinist activity at a time when the 
CPGB presented itself as a conventional British party. 
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What is entrism? 
 
The contest for the leadership of the British Labour Party in 2016 provoked renewed interest in 
Trotskyist infiltration (Aitkenhead, Stewart & Elgot, 2016). ‘Entrism’ was a feature of labour 
movement politics through the twentieth century. The best-known episode involved the 
expulsion of the Militant Tendency from Labour in the 1980s and 1990s (Callaghan, 1984, pp. 
67–81; Crick, 1986, 2016). But it is not a peculiarly British phenomenon. In the 1920s, US 
Communists operated secretly inside local Labor and Farmer-Labor Parties and, in the 1930s 
and 1940s, inside the Democratic Party in California, Illinois, North Dakota, Ohio and 
Pennsylvania.1 The best documented case is the entry of the Workers’ Party led by James P. 
Cannon and A.J. Muste into the Socialist Party (SP) (Cannon, 1972, pp. 216–256; 
Venkataramani, 1964; Alexander, 1991, pp. 779–793). The pervasiveness of the practice is 
witnessed by the fact that when the Workers’ Party entered the SP, they encountered activists 
linked to the Communist Party and Jay Lovestone’s Communist Opposition (Alexander, 1981, 
pp. 109–110). France has provided entrism’s most fertile field, from ‘the French turn’, the 
entry of Trotsky’s followers into the Socialist Party, the Section française de l’Internationale 
ouvrière (SFIO) in 1934, to the exploits of the Organisation Communiste Internationale (OCI) 
after 1968 (Trotsky, 1974, 1977; Alexander, 1991, pp. 348–354, 384–389; Nick, 2002, pp. 
217–264). In 2001 then French prime minister and sometime entrist, Lionel Jospin, confessed 
to maintaining close links with the OCI while working his way to the pinnacle of the Socialist 
Party (Schwartz, 2001; Nick, 2002, pp. 244–265). Entrism has been recorded across Europe, 
Asia and Australia (Alexander, 1991). 
 It has been broadly defined as ‘infiltration into a political organisation to change or 
subvert its policies or objectives’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995). One historian describes 
 3 
entrism as ‘the infiltration of a mass organisation by a small revolutionary group that hopes 
thereby to grow at the expense of the larger party’ (Callaghan, 1986, p. 380). Restriction to ‘a 
small revolutionary group’ may be questioned: the British Communist Party (CPGB) 
undertook incursions in the Labour Party with a membership of 10,000 in 1926 and 7,500 in 
1935 (Thorpe, 2000, p. 284). Although the phenomenon is associated with ‘covert factional 
activity’ (Callaghan, 1984, p. 380), its initiation, it should be stressed, may be open and 
consensual. The event from which the term derives, the 1934 ‘French turn’, was negotiated by 
the Trotskyist leaders and their SFIO counterparts and provided for some factional rights 
(Alexander, 1991, pp. 348–354).2 The passage of the US Trotskyists into Norman Thomas’s 
party was likewise agreed, although they joined as individuals, forfeited their factional rights 
and dismantled their press (Cannon, 1972, pp. 216–256; Myers, 1977, pp. 107–142; 
Venkataramani, 1964, pp. 10–11). In both cases, the inauguration of entrism was transparent 
and ‘infiltration’ a misnomer. However, the underlying purpose of the project was subversive 
and factionalism soon surfaced. The intention was to build French and American Trotskyist 
parties at the expense of the SFIO and SP.  
The definitions quoted above simplify a diverse phenomenon. Entrism can take 
different forms and dissolution of the invader’s own external organisation with all its members 
entering the host should be distinguished from partial entry and maintenance of the aggressor’s 
external organisation. If Callaghan’s formulation is overly restrictive in some aspects, in other 
ways it appears too broad. The inclusion of trade unions may be questioned. Political parties 
demand a degree of political homogeneity and discipline. Unions are politically heterodox, 
open to all workers in specific employment categories, regardless of belief. Revolutionaries 
should not be classified as interlopers, any more than Catholics or Conservatives, who have 
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also established factional organisations within trade unions. Limiting the term entrism to 
political parties enhances precision and clarity.3  
 Entrism demands reconnaissance. Protagonists may be alerted to its potential by a turn 
to the left and emergence of tendencies sympathetic to the entrists within the targeted 
organisation.4 Having gained access, entrists endeavour to secretly recruit members of the host, 
typically insisting they remain within the host as agents of its competitor: success depends on 
converting indigenous members who will make further converts. Infiltration is a means, not an 
end. Its scale may differ as some entrist organisations send a fraction of their members into a 
targeted body while others enter en masse. Unpacked, the aim ‘to grow at the expense of the 
larger party’ (Callaghan, 1986, p. 380) may cover a range of ambitions. In the early 1950s, the 
International Socialists entered the Labour Party simply because they saw little possibility of 
development as an open organisation and needed an established political framework to 
resource even modest growth.5 Aspirations ‘to change or subvert policies or objectives’ 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary) may be deemed unrealistic or eschewed on the grounds that they 
sow illusions in the host. Other entrist groups may press revolutionary demands on reformist 
leaders as a means of exposing them (Callaghan, 1984, pp. 73–76; Crick, 1986, pp. 70–84). In 
some cases, such as the CPGB’s suborning of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) or the US 
Trotskyists’ foray into the SP, the objective may be to take over or, should that prove 
impossible, decisively weaken a competitor. One leader claimed undermining the SP 
constituted ‘a great achievement because it was an obstacle in the path of building a 
revolutionary party … Every other party is an obstacle’ (Cannon, 1972, pp. 252–253). 
The purpose and progress of entrism influence its duration and whether it concentrates 
on creating a semi-permanent faction or organising a relatively speedy exit. There are tactics 
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within the tactic and entrism may be conceived and conducted in different ways. In 1926–
1929, the CPGB sponsored the National Left-Wing Movement (NLWM) as a bridge between 
the party and sympathisers inside Labour (Macfarlane, 1966, pp. 189–229, 280–281). Likewise 
maintaining an open organisation in the 1940s, the Revolutionary Communist Party’s entry 
fraction handed contacts over to external activists (Bornstein and Richardson, 1986b, pp. 192–
194). Gerry Healy’s ‘Club’ in the 1ate 1940s and Sean Matgamna’s International Communist 
League in the late 1970s, conducted entrism within broader left Labour formations – the 
Socialist Fellowship and the Socialist Campaign for a Labour Victory (Alexander, 1991, pp. 
496–498; Jenkins, 1979, pp. 91–112). Others, starting with the Revolutionary Socialist 
League’s formation of the Militant Labour League in 1937, have established their own fronts 
(Bornstein and Richardson, 1986a, pp. 272–273). The Militant Tendency, in contrast, operated 
more directly (Crick, 1986, pp. 84–86). 
History is indispensable to any discussion. Commonly associated with Trotskyism and 
disparaged by official Communists, entrism was an integral part of the Stalinist tradition. Its 
roots lie in the approach to party-building adopted by the Comintern and its national sections, 
as well as dissident currents, notably the Trotskyists. The tactic can be traced back to the 
Bolsheviks, adhesion to whose methods was prescribed by Lenin in his Theses for the Second 
Congress of the Comintern: 
In every organisation, union or association without exception, beginning with the 
proletarian ones at first, and afterwards all those of the non-proletarian exploited 
masses (political, professional, military, cooperative, educational, sporting, etc) must be 
formed groups or nuclei of Communists, mostly open ones but also secret ones … 
These nuclei, in close contact with one another and the Communist Party, exchanging 
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information and experiences, carrying on the work of agitation, propaganda and 
organising, adjust themselves to all the branches of social life (Callaghan, 1986, pp. 
380–382; Lenin, 1920). 
Lenin insisted on the centrality of penetrating the Labour Party: 
So long as the Labour Party continues to leave its member organisations free to 
criticise, act, make propaganda, agitate and organise on behalf of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and on behalf of Soviet power … Communists should make every effort and 
be willing to accept certain compromises in order to have the chance of influencing the 
great mass of workers, of denouncing their opportunist leaders in public forum where 
the masses can see and hear them … so as to rid the masses as soon as possible of their 
illusions on the subject (Lazitch & Drachkovitch, 1972, p. 361). 
 Labour was crucial, despite its subordination to the state, because its umbilical 
connection with the trade unions, its undeveloped programme and rudimentary constitution 
ensured it possessed widespread working-class support and political and organisational 
malleability. As the revolutionary atmosphere of 1920 dissolved and the differences between 
Labour and the CPGB hardened, the former moved to isolate the latter: freedom to prosecute 
revolutionary politics within Labour diminished, concealment increased. Burning his boats 
with the Comintern, Trotsky maintained some of its methods. He initially applied entrism to 
small ‘centrist’ formations moving to the left. The tactic continued to be predicated on the open 
expression of revolutionary politics and envisaged as an episode of limited duration to recruit 
members rather than change policy. In France and the USA, it lasted around a year (Alexander, 
1991, pp. 351–352; Cannon, 1972, pp. 249–252).  
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 But the device was essentially opportunistic: experience and changing circumstances 
provoked development and adaptation. From the mid-1930s, both Trotskyists and Stalinists 
concentrated on the reformist Labour Party and adopted subterfuge to deflect detection. Raids 
mutated into longer-term settlement premised on permeation of the host party’s institutions and 
culture. During the early Cold War this emerged as entrism sui generis, total entry, whereby 
the Trotskyists went into both Communist and Labour parties for an indefinite period on the 
basis that the international situation and likelihood of war precluded the construction of 
revolutionary parties (Alexander, 1991, p. 28). From the 1950s, less apocalyptic forms of ‘deep 
entrism’ were employed, such as that practised by the Militant Tendency and its co-thinkers 
around the globe (Crick, 1986; Revolutionary Socialist League, 1959).6 Entrism has registered 
small successes but never transformed the balance of forces within the labour movement. At 
times it has divided revolutionaries, some of whom have opposed it as an illegitimate and 
ineffective method of party building, turned disguised revolutionaries into genuine reformists, 
corrupted the currency of politics and discredited its protagonists.7 
 
Comintern entrism: the British case 
Entrism is identified in public discourse and historiography with Trotskyism: Stalinist activity 
has attracted less attention. In distinction to the Trotskyists’ predilection for total entry, the 
official Communists, given their greater numbers, pursued partial entry by means of fractions 
working inside Labour. Launched by the Communists in 1926 and terminated by them in early 
1929, the NLWM has been considered a vehicle for ‘systematic entrist activity in the Labour 
Party’ (Callaghan, 1986, p. 385). It would be mistaken to minimise the degree to which the 
NLWM was directed and resourced by the Comintern and CPGB (Macfarlane, 1966, pp. 189–
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229, 280–218; Pearce, 1975). Matters are complicated by the fact that the movement 
crystallised around the 1925 decision to exclude Communists from individual membership of 
the Labour Party and opposition not only from Communists but ‘native’ Labour Party 
members. The main component of the CPGB, the British Socialist Party, had been affiliated to 
Labour. So many CPGB members possessed and maintained dual membership. They were 
legitimate Labour Party members and even stood as Labour candidates in elections. 
Exclusionary measures had been mounting since 1920 and would develop further (Shaw, 1988, 
pp. 1–31; Howell, 2002, pp. 380–403). But toleration of Communists lingered among a 
sizeable minority and the NWLM possessed appreciable organic support in Labour’s ranks; it 
was far from clandestine, publishing a popular weekly newspaper, advocating a socialist 
programme. The CPGB employed the NLWM to build the CPGB. But a powerful element in 
the movement’s animating dynamic was resistance within Labour to its leadership’s attempt to 
finally close the frontier between Labourism and Communism.  
 Bans on Communists and extensive powers for Labour’s National Executive (NEC) to 
enforce them became entrenched. With the introduction of the proscribed list in 1930, the 
dividing line was firmly drawn – a process facilitated by the CPGB’s turn away from Labour in 
the ultra-left Third Period. In 1929 the NEC reported: ‘practically all difficulties experienced in 
constituencies in recent years owing to Communist activities have now been overcome’ (Shaw, 
1988, p. 15). The classic conditions for entrism now prevailed. Yet the CPGB’s major essay in 
entrism, which embraced the Popular Front years and beyond, has been neglected. This may be 
related to the Communists’ subsequent denigration of ‘the cynical, dishonest strategy and 
tactics of “entryism”’ they had pioneered (Morning Star, October 15, 2016).8 The tactic was 
abandoned during the Second World War and the 1950s witnessed the CPGB acting as an 
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informer in exposing the entrism of opponents.9 The new century found its successor advising 
Labour’s general secretary: ‘Should you or your staff have any evidence that Communist Party 
members have joined the Labour Party without renouncing their CP membership or engaged in 
any similar subterfuge, please inform me so that action can be taken against them for bringing 
our party into disrepute’ (Wright, 2016).  
It is therefore unsurprising that Communist historians who represent Popular Front 
politics as the apogee of CPGB achievement and respectability omit to reconstruct the 
insalubrious underbelly of those politics. Branson (1985) deals with entrism perfunctorily and 
evasively. She blandly states that from 1935, ‘more and more local Labour Party members 
applied to join the Communist Party. Some of them were encouraged to stay in the Labour 
Party and work to change it. Indeed, some of them became Communists in secret’ (p.157). This 
process was short-lived, terminating in 1939, when ‘they were all asked to come out into the 
open as Communist Party members … those who did not ceased to be members of the 
Communist party’ (ibid.). Nothing is said about CPGB members disguising their political 
allegiance to join the Labour Party; the active agency of the Comintern and CPGB 
headquarters in King Street in organising entrism is deleted. The CPGB is cast as little more 
than a responsive helpmate to Labour Party members coming to Communism of their own 
volition. As an activist in the CPGB during this period, it beggars belief that Branson was 
unaware of entrism as a project to undermine Labour – and indeed she refers to it in a 
contemporary internal bulletin (Branson, 1936, p. 19). Other accounts by Communist are even 
less revealing.10 
Academic historians have not greatly advanced matters.11 Like Branson, Morgan 
(1989) passes favourable judgement on Popular Front politics and his study of the CPGB 
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1935–1941 disposes of entrism in a paragraph. Like Branson, he portrays an impetus to 
collaboration originating inside the Labour Party; despite unrelenting efforts by the NEC to 
define and enforce a dividing line, he depicts flexible frontiers. In short: ‘throughout the late 
1930s impetuous spirits within the Labour Party discovered their common cause with the 
Communists. The dividing line between the CP and the Labour left was virtually indefinable, 
not least because an unquantifiable number of Communists pursued their Popular Front 
activities within the Labour Party’ (Morgan, 1989, p. 36). This is less organised entrism than 
an autonomous meeting of minds across fluid party boundaries. If Branson illustrates the 
problems with history written by Communists, Morgan exemplifies the difficulty of accepting, 
without reservation or corroboration, the recollections of Communist officials on controversial 
matters. Branson’s conclusion is echoed through uncritical rehearsal of the assertion of the 
CPGB’s London organiser in the 1930s, Ted Bramley: ‘It was not a case of Communists being 
sent into the Labour Party, according to Bramley, but rather of new recruits to the CP being 
asked to remain within the Labour Party the more effectively to work for unity’(ibid.).12 We 
now know that Bramley played a leading role in supervising the CPGB’s policy of entry which 
required Communists to be sent into the Labour Party as well as new recruits being asked to 
remain as secret Communists.13 
This is touched on by Thorpe (2000) who alludes to the CPGB Central Committee (CC) 
discussing ‘sending thousands of [CPGB] members into the Labour Party’ where they would 
‘link up with Communists already inside’ (pp. 232–233). Contrary to Bramley’s testimony, this 
suggests that the CPGB aspired to plant a significant proportion of its then 11,000 members 
inside its antagonist. Thorpe’s handful of references conclude by following Branson – in 1939 
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Labour activists began to ‘emerge openly as Communist sympathisers’ – and contribute to the 
narrative of normalisation. The notion that entrism was subversive is downplayed: 
It seems likely that Communists had joined the Labour Party since the early 
1930s. This might have had a sinister aspect – the CP inveigling its members 
into the larger organisation so that they could be ‘turned’ at the appropriate time. 
But in many parts of Britain, there was a more prosaic reason. In localities 
where the CP organisation was very weak or non-existent, it made sense for 
people to join the existing Labour organisation rather than to form a CP branch 
with one or two members (ibid.).14 
For whom it made sense and how this related to King Street planning to draft thousands 
of Communists into the Labour Party is not explained. A later discussion by Morgan and his 
colleagues (Morgan, Cohen & Flinn, 2007) attempts to further normalise matters: 
… the very concept of infiltration … is freighted with ambiguity. In contemporary 
polemics, and sometimes academic accounts, it involves the construction of 
communism as an ‘outside’ presence bringing in alien values and loyalties like a 
Stalinist version of the Midwitch Cuckoos … the notion of infiltration, always 
implicitly from outside, can be positively misleading … even the clearest cases of 
factionalism or dissimulation tended to rest on a significant process of internal 
conversion which the suggestion of externality only obscures (p.130).  
No academic – and no academic account is cited to support this contention – needs to 
construct Communism as an outside presence because in relation to Labour it was, politically 
and organisationally, an outside presence. The CPGB, as we shall demonstrate, sent its 
members from ‘outside’ to infiltrate Labour with the purpose of winning converts and 
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influencing Labour policy on affiliation and the Popular Front. It is difficult to see how such 
infiltration can be considered ‘ambiguous’ because it depended for success on ‘internal 
conversion’. That the latter is a key objective of the former is common sense and commonplace 
in the historical record. The notion of infiltration by the CPGB is only ‘misleading’ if we fail to 
understand what the Stalinist entrism of the 1930s was: a process by which the external became 
internal and the internal external through subterfuge. In contrast with some contemporary 
Trotskyist initiatives, entrism equalled external infiltration plus secret internal conversion.  
Morgan et al. cite no academic account which in any way likens the intervention by 
Stalinists in the Labour Party to the impregnation of women by aliens in John Wyndham’s 
fantasy.15 Nor is proper substantiation provided for their claim: ‘extensive common ground 
between the communists and many Labour activists meant that in practice there was little 
constraint on the expression of current communist policy’ (p. 132). Insistence that ‘the great 
majority of the CPGB’s undercover members appear to have joined the Labour Party either 
before or more or less simultaneously with their adhesion to communism’ (p. 131) may be true. 
But no evidence is offered to support an assertion minimising the role of outsiders; or the 
further claim that active concealment of their affiliation by Communists operating inside 
Labour was exceptional.16 What proportion of Communists had been infiltrated into the Labour 
Party or received secretly into the CPGB after reading its literature and/or encountering 
Communists working outside or inside the Labour Party is a relevant question; but it is one 
which requires testing via further research. Estimates based on impressions neither detract from 
the reality of infiltration as an integral component of entrism nor render it ambiguous. 
This account tells us little about the policy of entrism beyond a claim that ‘the sustained 
campaign dated only from 1937’ and a precise statement that the following year ‘almost a fifth 
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of the CPGB’s entire membership’ operated clandestinely inside the Labour Party (p. 131).17 
Communists operating inside the Labour Party are explained by reference to geographical 
isolation from fellow CPGB members, migration and local political ecumenism: ‘the 
significance of local factors in shaping political affiliations survived the seemingly formalised 
divide between the Labour and Communist parties. In certain periods it was even sanctioned 
and exploited by the CPGB itself’ (p. 30). A footnote refers to a study documenting 
collaboration between Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and ILP branches decades earlier 
(p. 287, n. 78).18 The evidence for survival of such impulses permitting dual membership in the 
1930s is slight. In Oxford, it is asserted, ‘covert membership of the Labour Party was so 
general and ill-concealed as scarcely to be undercover at all’ (Morgan et al., 2007, p. 44). No 
source is cited and while this was true of the student milieu, evidence is required as to the 
different situation in the City Labour Party. The claim that Tom Mitchell in Letchworth and 
Fred Westacott in Hampshire operated without concealing their CPGB membership may again 
be true. But it derives solely from their memories – in the latter case a sentence – fifty and 
sixty years respectively after the event (ibid.). By then both had been full-time CPGB officials. 
Both were reminiscing at a time when entrism had fallen into disrepute among Communists. 
And both their stories are detached from their political context: the prevailing policy of 
entrism. 
For their part, historians of the Labour Party have documented CPGB attempts to 
engage Labour in collaboration against fascism and its equally unsuccessful endeavours to 
secure affiliation. The story they tell is of a leadership, apparatus and majority of members not 
only opposed to welcoming Communists into their party via affiliation but to working with 
them in a united front. A minority supported co-operation. There is little evidence they shared 
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CPGB politics or tolerated ‘unconcealed’ CPGB activists operating within their party. Far from 
the divide being ‘virtually undefined’, by 1934 few leftwing Labour activists could have been 
unaware that the CPGB was a proscribed outsider.19 However, standard histories of Labour 
which cover the period say nothing about entrism.20 Specialist studies contribute little more. 
Pimlott (1977) makes a couple of vague references (p. 222, n. 12); Callaghan (1987) baldly 
asserts that the CPGB pursued entrism ‘for the first twenty years of its existence … But by 
1940 the tactic was dropped … as constituency parties withered away’ (p. 189); Worley (2005) 
suggests that ‘a number’ of Labour Party members held what he euphemistically terms ‘joint 
membership’ with the CPGB during the 1930s (p. 210).21 
 Overall, the historiography affords entrism scant attention. Work on Communism 
addresses the phenomenon in sanitised, fragmentary and impressionistic fashion. It contains 
conflicting estimates of timeline, scale and operation; infiltration, secrecy, dissembling and 
disguise are minimised. Conclusions light on evidence speak more of symbiosis and a 
consensual desire for unity on the part of members of two parties, the boundaries between 
which were virtually indefinable, rather than a manipulative enterprise orchestrated by the 
Comintern and resisted by a Labour Party which was very clear about what divided it from the 
CPGB and the latter’s subversive intentions. King Street’s efforts to suppress its past have not 
been adequately challenged. CPGB general secretary, Harry Pollitt, told the Political Bureau 
(PB) in 1935 he did ‘not think that in any circumstances, or in any document we should refer to 
the question of organising the Left wing inside the Labour Party. It becomes a question of the 
“Trojan Horse”’.22 If the secretive nature of the project renders full recovery hazardous, data 
from the Russian archives enables us to at least reconstruct its contours and memoirs and 
manuscript material permit recuperation of some of its protagonists. Politics is frequently an 
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ignoble pursuit. The tale of political parasitism which follows confirms that the labour 
movement was not immune to the malaise. It demonstrates that entrism was integral to the 
Communists’ Popular Front strategy which some historians have treated favourably. And it 
reinstates the conspiratorial, Machiavellian aspects of the CPGB, subdued in recent literature, 
which, inter alia, distinguished it from other British parties.  
 
Popular Front entrism: background, initiation and organisation 
In the autumn of 1937, CPGB activists were recording gains garnered from four years of 
entrism and deliberating future possibilities: 
 During recent months the Party position in relation to the Labour Party has  
 considerably improved. In Liverpool we now have something like 45  
 Communist Party members inside the Labour party. One of these comrades is 
 the secretary of the District Labour Party and one is the Secretary of the  
Ward Association. The reflection of the work which the Party has undertaken  
inside the Labour Party is shown by the fact that we have [sic] six Communist Party 
members standing as Labour Party candidates in the recent Municipal Elections … 
[In Manchester] only 25% of the Trade Union Branches available for affiliation 
to the Borough Labour Party, are affiliated to it, and if our drive was intensified  
among the trade unionists in order to secure their affiliation … this would in all 
probability enable us to overcome the majority which the right-wing Labour  
leadership has on the Borough Labour Party and secure the removal of the  
right-wing leadership itself.23 
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The ‘drive’ dated from 1934. However, the previous year, Labour’s NEC, documenting 
the proliferation of CPGB ‘fronts’, had observed: ‘Communists in disguise are now at work in 
Labour Party and Trade Union and Cooperative Societies’.24 By early 1934, London 
Communists were beavering away ‘to get a political foothold in the Ward Committees of the 
LP … there are members of the Executive of the Labour Party and Socialist League who have 
expressed a desire to join the Party, but our comrades advise them to remain in to penetrate 
further with their work’.25 Comintern directives called for extension of reconnaissance and 
small-scale initiatives. In April 1934, Moscow instructed British Communists ‘to establish 
connections and close comradely association with the Labour Party workers, drawing them into 
the United Front fight’; compile lists of sympathisers within Labour; and pave the path for 
‘Party fraction comrades to be invited to speak at Labour Party Branches’.26 A month later, 
Pollitt pondered ‘how can we develop the opposition movement inside the Labour Party’, 
while R.W. Robson reflected uncertainty in the ranks: ‘I think that there is an underestimation 
by the Party comrades of the work that can be done inside the Labour Party.’27 
 The following year, party minutes recorded a measure of success. Pollitt informed the 
CC: 
We have got two Party members adopted as Labour Party candidates in places  
where as Communist candidates we could not get a look in ... In one of the  
newer districts we are in a position where everyone is a member of our Party.  
It has been done by very careful consistent work, by choosing the right people  
who would work in closest conjunction with the Party … what has been done  
in these places can be done in other places … we carefully choose Party members  
who are 100 per cent trustworthy, not open to reformist persuasion, and  
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deliberately send these comrades into local Labour Parties to develop that  
opposition. Under no circumstances [must they] speak about Communism.28 
 Thus, by 1937 entrism already constituted a significant aspect of CPGB activity. It was 
not left to isolated individuals, a side line innocent of collective agency and purpose; nor did 
policy commence with existing Labour Party members converting to Communism. To achieve 
that aim, CPGB members were infiltrated into the Labour Party. That they were ‘100 per cent 
trustworthy’ suggests they were not invariably recent recruits to the CPGB. Communists 
undoubtedly exploited areas where Labour organisation was rudimentary and their own 
affiliations unknown. Evidence of CPGB activity in London, Liverpool and Manchester 
indicates that this was not always the case. Pollitt’s insistence on omerta concerning 
Communism is redolent of ‘deep entrism’; but entry was far from total and the CPGB 
maintained its external apparatus. 
 The developments prompting entrism require emphasis. Before 1933 there were cases 
when a Communist joined Labour where the CPGB was weakly organised, ‘as a means of 
taking my communism inside the enemy camp’.29 The policy of ‘Class Against Class’, which 
characterised Labour as a third capitalist party, precluded entrism of any significance. Hitler’s 
accession to power in January 1933 stimulated a return to proposing a united front with 
working-class parties to combat the threat to the Soviet Union.30 The second factor was the 
divide between the parties and Labour’s refusal to countenance collaboration. As entrism 
gathered momentum in 1934, Labour’s NEC declared that any united action or ‘loose 
association’ with Communists or their front organisations was incompatible with Labour Party 
membership – a decision overwhelmingly endorsed at that year’s annual conference. Labour 
leaders perceived the CPGB as devious, ruthless and purveying ideas alien to its own 
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philosophy. Successive overtures were rejected in the knowledge that the united front was ‘a 
tactical manoeuvre devised to bring [Labour] members into touch with the Communist 
intelligentsia and ultimately under their leadership’.31 The CPGB was ‘a secret society’ 
employing ‘conspiratorial methods’ and subterfuge: ‘A denial by a person that he is a 
Communist may be true, or it may unfortunately not be true’.32  
 The third consideration was the CPGB’s inability to influence Labour by conventional 
means. It had 5,800 members at the end of 1934; Labour’s individual membership (as distinct 
from its affiliated trade union membership) was over 400,000 (Thorpe, 2000, p. 287). Lacking 
leverage to change Labour’s policy from outside, the Communists moved inside. A fourth 
factor was a small but vocal Labour left, disaffected by party leaders’ failure to take effective 
action against the National government or address a deteriorating international situation. The 
left was open to working with the Communists but weak – the Socialist League (SL), a 
remnant of the ILP which had disaffiliated from Labour in 1932, had fewer than 3,000 
members (Corthorn, 2006, p. 1 and passim; Pimlott, 1977, pp. 41–76). Its fragility suggested 
an opening Communists might exploit to develop internal opposition under CPGB hegemony. 
A pincer movement from outside and inside stood a better chance of propelling Labour 
towards unity than external pressure alone.33 
 The Seventh Comintern Congress in August 1935 marked a new stage in promotion of 
anti-fascist ‘people’s fronts’ embracing not only workers’ parties but ‘progressive’ Liberals 
and Conservatives. The CPGB now presented itself as a conventional British party, 
downplaying revolution, espousing patriotism, and conciliating amenable labour movement 
leaders, liberals of all parties, the ‘progressive’ middle class and intellectuals (Branson, 1985, 
pp. 112–29; Fyrth, 1985). The Comintern’s demand for ‘a single mass workers’ party in each 
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country’ produced the CPGB’s formal application for affiliation to Labour in November 1935. 
To achieve that end, intensification of entrism was necessary – diplomatically expressed as: 
‘More attention to the organisation of the left-wing inside the Labour Party’.34 A significant 
motivation of the subsequent adoption of anglicised organisational forms and terminology – 
‘locals’ were replaced by ‘branches’, a term ‘familiar to workers in this country’, and ‘cells’ by 
‘groups’ – was the need to develop ‘closer relations with Labour Ward Committees’ (Robson, 
1936, pp. 25–26). Every branch member was to be organised in their ‘appropriate Labour, Co-
operative or Trade Union fraction’ (Branson, 1936, p. 19).   
 It would be unrealistic to expect extensive discussion of the tradecraft of clandestinity 
in CPGB documents. Labour’s hostility to Communism is well-documented and officials such 
as Morgan Phillips in London, Len Williams in Yorkshire and Arthur Woodburn in Scotland 
were experienced gatekeepers. The hierarchy’s writ did not run everywhere and proselytising 
for unity was not the prerogative of interlopers. The fact that CPGB policy was increasingly 
reformist helped. Judging by autobiographical accounts, many concealed Communists were 
taken at face value as Labour enthusiasts of the Soviet Union and Popular Front, rather than 
intruders. Some converts welcomed their new double life: one expressed delight ‘when I was 
instructed to carry on with my [Labour Party] membership’ and predicted further recruits if it 
was made clear that ‘the [Communist] Party expects them to continue their work in the 
organisation in which they are at present members’ (Morris, 1937, pp. 12–13). In recollections 
corroborated by the historian, John Saville, briefly a CPGB branch secretary, Branson stated 
the party cards of secret members were held by party headquarters or the relevant district 
secretary (Branson, 1985, p. 157; Saville, 1991, p. 26, n. 10).35 Duplicity was formally 
licensed: trade unionists were instructed to deny CPGB membership in order to attend Labour 
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Party meetings but had to clear things with national or district leaders before protecting their 
position.36 In 1937 a Special Branch informant reported: 
Instructions are being issued that party members who have obtained positions in the 
Labour Party must hide the fact that they are communists. If they have compromised 
themselves in this respect in the past, they are to say that they have resigned from the 
party, if challenged.37 
 Unlike subsequent entrists, the CPGB nurtured few illusions that Labour could be 
transformed into a socialist party. Unlike later infiltrators, it eschewed schemes for a 
breakaway based on the CPGB, the SL and the ILP, in which it was also conducting entrism. 
That might bring into question the leading role of the Comintern. The purpose was rather to 
push the Labour Party as presently constituted into a Popular Front alliance on the French 
model by securing CPGB affiliation.38 The primacy of affiliation and consequent need to 
demonstrate respectability ensured that the CPGB did not attract attention and appear 
disruptive by espousing manoeuvres common in entrist narratives, seeking cover by colonising 
existing Labour groups – or inventing new ones. It did discuss infiltrating the SL. Elaborating 
‘on Communist fraction work inside the Labour Party’ in June 1935, CPGB organiser Dave 
Springhall urged: ‘we should put special chosen people to work in the Socialist League … In 
London, there are a number of middle-class elements and workers who cannot be used for open 
Party work, who can be drafted for work inside the Socialist League and the Labour Party’.39 
There was more ambivalence about the Constituency Parties Movement (CPM) which 
campaigned for increased representation of local parties on Labour’s NEC. There is little 
evidence Communists played a leading role here.40 
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 Entrism encouraged accommodation to Labour. In the 1935 general election, the CPGB 
fielded only two candidates and urged support for the party recently excoriated as ‘social 
fascist’. There was some disorientation among activists, ‘as if they’ve got to take back all they 
said in the past concerning the Labour Party. An inner feeling they’re making some kind of 
surrender’.41 But there was no let-up in entrism. The Lancashire organiser, William Rust, 
argued: 
where there are people in the Labour Party who are prepared to join the  
[Communist] Party we should carefully consider whether they should remain 
in the Labour Party. We should consider still further the sending of people  
into the Labour Party in order to win leading positions, to have in every  
[CPGB] District Committee somebody responsible for work in the Labour  
Party and nationally.42 
It was accepted that every district should have a cadre in charge of entry work ‘without 
any revelations being put in the press’.43 But there was concern over making concessions to 
reformism. There was uncertainty about whether the weight of entry work should be borne by 
new recruits remaining inside Labour or those sent in by the CPGB; and differences regarding 
the extent to which recruits should be pulled out to build the CPGB as open Communists. 
Mindful of the Comintern leader, Dimitrov’s, strictures against ‘right opportunism’ and an 
instruction from Moscow to ‘correct’ over-identification with Labour, Pollitt was critical of his 
party’s election activities:  
We have not asked any of the Labour Party workers to join our Party … it would  
be a tragedy if we, in the carrying out of united activity, tend to succumb to  
reformist lines or encouraged a belief in them … And we recruit every member  
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of the Labour Party into the Communist Party who wants to join … This does  
not mean that they should break their connections.44 
Walking the tightrope between working within Labour and conciliating reformism, 
between pedagogic adaptation and political capitulation, required hands-on guidance from the 
Comintern. Ruminating ‘we can very easily go wrong unless we are very careful’, Pollitt 
travelled to Russia.45 The Comintern maintained its stance against ‘liquidationist tendencies’ 
and rejected suggestions that the CPGB should complete what some perceived as the logic of 
entrism by acting as a recruiting sergeant for Labour. Suitably emboldened, Pollitt on his return 
renewed his criticism of the party for ‘submerging its independent line’ during the election: 
‘the propaganda was for voting Labour on exactly the same line of argument as the ordinary 
trade union reformist type of Labour worker, and this constitutes a very serious danger for the 
Party’.46 He urged greater recruitment into the CPGB to counteract accommodationist 
tendencies. If Labour Party militants felt they could do their best work there, ‘nothing but 
disaster lies in front’.47 Support for publicly recruiting workers who were neither in the CPGB 
nor the Labour Party into the latter came from the party full-timer, Emile Burns. Others 
resisted this as a step towards total entry and dissolving the CPGB. But it resonated with 
activists. Pollitt reported that at a CPGB conference in Nottingham, ‘the line of half was 
affiliation and the other half said we need a change in line so badly we should liquidate the CP 
and get inside the Labour Party’.48 
This latter group believed the urgency of a Popular Front demanded total entry to 
challenge Labour opposition more effectively. Rust and Pollitt articulated the Comintern’s 
position. Rust rejected illusions ‘that the Labour Party can be made into the Party that will 
bring socialism in Britain’; Pollitt stressed ‘our fight against social democracy must be carried 
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on more bitterly than before’.49 Quoting Dimitrov, Manuilsky and Stalin, Pollitt repudiated 
Burns’ proposal as tantamount to dissolving the CPGB.50 Worry that the affiliation campaign 
and entrism could, paradoxically, constitute an avenue via which Communists became 
Labourites and condemnation of Burns’ ‘right-wing errors’ was reiterated by the CPGB’s 
representative at the Comintern, Robin Page Arnot, addressing the Marty Secretariat in 
Moscow: ‘there were Party members in London who were openly discussing and expecting the 
liquidation of the CP’.51 This caused consternation and Comintern representatives demanded 
reassurance it was a minority view. Affiliation, bringing in its train legitimacy for the CPGB 
and a diminished need for dissimulation, could have ameliorated these problems. But it was 
rejected at Labour’s 1936 conference by 1.7 million votes to 592,000 (Labour Party, 1936, p. 
208).52  
 
From Popular Front to Imperialist War: progress, problems and demise  
Defeat prompted further affirmation that entrism should be prosecuted more energetically to 
facilitate future affiliation. At the post-mortem in October 1936, the party’s leading 
intellectual, Rajani Palme Dutt, maintained, ‘we have got to strengthen our work in the Labour 
Party. We want to get more and more active members in the Labour Party fighting on a 
common programme.’53 Pollitt went further, dubbing infiltration ‘the biggest task of the party 
… we have literally to send thousands of our members inside the Labour Party’.54 The CPGB’s 
sole MP, Willie Gallacher, insisted his party must become ‘an integral part of the Labour 
Party’ and form ‘an alternative leadership inside the Labour Party’, but queried: ‘How is it to 
be done?’55 
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The SL’s pliability promised a possible solution: led by Sir Stafford Cripps, it favoured 
a united front with the CPGB and the ILP. Negotiations, monitored by the Comintern, 
culminated in a Unity Campaign in January 1937.56 It lasted less than three months, as 
Labour’s NEC moved decisively to proscribe the SL: ‘The Socialist League is now seeking to 
provide a bridge to make the Communist invasion of our ranks easier.’57 The PB supported the 
League’s decision to dissolve, with its members continuing to agitate individually for a united 
front. Pollitt had never been impressed by its utility as a vehicle for Communist permeation of 
the Labour Party.58 Initiating the Unity Campaign, the Comintern had re-emphasised 
infiltration: ‘The Communist Party must give more attention to sending into the Labour Party 
trusted comrades who can be relied upon to develop the mass movement for unity within the 
Labour Party.’59 In its aftermath, Arnot reassured the Marty Secretariat that despite the furore 
over the SL, ‘[Ernest] Bevin and [Walter] Citrine don’t know … that there are many hundreds 
of members in the LP who are Communists’.60 
In August 1937, before departure to Russia of another delegation, a CC review 
highlighted progress with the entrist tactic but continuing problems in applying it. 61 
Applauding ‘splendid results’ in London, Bramley argued the ‘new situation’ required the 
CPGB to recruit to the Labour Party workers not yet willing to join the CPGB:  
We stamped on this a year ago. I agree we have got to put more and more  
of our best people in the Labour movement … but is it not true that the great  
bulk of people that follow us are not yet Communists … there must be thousands  
of workers who would go into the Labour movement and not fall under the  
influence of Transport House but under the influence of our organised fractions. 
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If CPGB infiltrators could be augmented by non-CPGB Labour Party sympathisers, 
why not reinforce the latter by recruiting to Labour? Burns concurred: ‘we have to regard the 
Labour Party ward associations under our leadership, as … a part of our organisation. 
[Recruiting to them] does not mean bringing members of the working class under the influence 
of reformist ideology … They are very rapidly brought forward under the influence of our 
comrades.’ Appreciating recruiting to a reformist party had been anathema to revolutionaries, 
Rust opposed blanket recruiting but offered a pragmatic prescription for entrists who won 
positions: ‘You cannot have a local secretary or executive that refuses to recruit. We have to 
have strong ward associations where we have the people there.’ He reported that Communists 
had ‘captured’ positions on the executive of the Manchester Labour Party and ‘we had to work 
out with these comrades the whole plan of campaign in the Labour Party’. Maurice Cornforth 
agreed. Communists who held positions had to recruit but this was different from a public 
declaration that the CPGB would recruit for Labour. In ‘the Eastern Counties’, sending ‘some 
of our best comrades’ into the Labour Party had exposed the need to finesse CPGB control 
over the work: ‘there is a tendency to leave the Comrades alone not knowing what to do and 
therefore they do not act in the most effective manner … we have to get them linked up 
together, to supervise and lead their work.’ 
Other speakers noted the difficulty in drafting in seasoned Communists whose 
reputation may have preceded them but accepted the need to expedite infiltration and 
strengthen its oversight. Springhall claimed that in the capital it would be possible ‘to put in 
another five hundred or more in the next few months’. It was vital that entrists start from 
bread-and-butter issues and proceed to high politics, ‘by getting down to the question of the 
actual problems of the local labour movement and linking them with the big national 
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campaigns, at the same time carrying through our propaganda for Marxism’. Fraction work 
should be supervised from the centre ‘in a much more organised way than has existed in the 
past’. 
In Moscow, the CPGB delegation laboured with a Comintern commission over a 
resolution, ‘The Next Steps in the Fight for Working Class Unity’. Endorsed by the Comintern 
secretariat, the text emphasised that the affiliation campaign should ‘be more than ever 
energetically carried forward’; recognising differentiation in Labour, it stressed the importance 
of appealing to the centre and isolating the right. To that end, the Comintern authorised its 
British affiliate to announce it would abide by Labour’s constitution. The CPGB should ‘seek 
by every means’ to extend ‘local unity in all forms’, while the ‘struggle for correct working 
class policy inside the Labour Party’ was counterposed to ‘self-liquidation chatter’.62 Pollitt 
presented the document to the CC, insisting its origin be concealed from members: ‘this 
resolution is the product of British circumstances and conditions’ and should be ‘popularised 
… without any references to discussions having taken place either here or elsewhere’.63 
Meetings would be held in every district to ensure its implementation. Antagonism from 
Labour’s leadership and most members remained strong. The 1937 conference overwhelmingly 
confirmed the banning of the SL and opposition to cooperation with Communists. Moreover, 
further discussion of affiliation was caught by the ‘three-year rule’ and could not be reopened 
until 1939.  
Renewed concern about the organisational looseness of fractions inside Labour led the 
CC to establish ‘a secret department … set up to control members of the party who have 
obtained official positions in local Labour Parties … They will not attend the Party meetings 
and, in order to maintain contact, they will secretly be called together from time to time, when 
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the Party line will be explained to them …’.64 The department was under the general direction 
of Bramley, assisted in the London district, an important locus of entrism, by Jack Gaster. In 
February 1938, a ‘closed’ meeting of CPGB fraction leaders in the Labour Party in London 
was attended by around 50 people and chaired by Bramley, accompanied by Gaster.65 A letter 
sent by Gaster convening a further ‘secret’ meeting was reported to be phrased in such a way 
as to conceal from the ‘uninitiated’ that it dealt with ‘Communist Party contact work in Labour 
organisations’. Each copy of the letter was individually numbered and it was clear that Gaster 
was making every effort ‘to keep as secret as possible this phase of Communist Party 
activity’.66 A report of the meeting revealed Gaster expounding party policy: ‘All members 
should get their local Labour Parties to send a deputation to Transport House on the question of 
unity … The immediate programme of the Communist Party contacts in the Labour Party 
should be (1) Campaign for arms for Spain (2) Concrete plans for adequate air-raid precautions 
(3) Closer cooperation with industrial workers …’.67 He announced plans to significantly 
strengthen the ‘Labour Party Bureau’ on the CPGB London District Committee and that ‘The 
Communist Party Group in the Labour Party’ would have representation and voting rights at 
the London District Party Congress.68 
Gaster energetically prosecuted his new responsibilities; for example, an informer 
reported that he had visited the Kingston branch of the CPGB and it had been agreed that four 
members would be ‘ostensibly leaving the C.P.’ in order to ‘concentrate on gaining Labour 
Party cooperation in the United Front’.69 Testimony to the results of such interventions was 
provided some two years later by the well-publicised resignations of the secretary and chair of 
the Kingston District Labour Party, together with those of the secretary of the Kingston 
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Borough Labour Party and a former Prospective Parliamentary Candidate, as well as six others, 
a number of them announcing their intention to join the CPGB.70  
Nevertheless, the landscape was darkening. Springhall reported tensions between the 
Labour Party fraction and open Communists. When CPGB branches mounted public 
campaigns, ‘our people who are in the Labour Party advise against this … because by doing so 
we harm the chances of developing their work and would tend to reveal them as Communists 
in the Labour Party’.71 A few months later, Dutt identified ‘a new type of secret member – the 
half-baked Communist, who has never had experience and full outlook of the Communist 
Party, but has only known existence as a secret member of the Communist Party’.72 There was 
a danger of dilution so that the CPGB would be starved of forces to mount effective 
independent campaigns. Dutt questioned the assumption every Labour supporter who wished 
to join the CPGB should become a secret member inside the Labour Party; this would restrict 
open recruitment to ‘miscellaneous elements outside of the Labour Movement’ and adversely 
skew the party’s social composition. There was, moreover, the possibility that clandestine 
members would never achieve ‘a Communist outlook and understanding’. Dutt concluded that 
only those who held important positions in the Labour Party should remain, while ‘everyday 
Labour Party workers’ should be encouraged to join the CPGB openly.73 
Failure to achieve a breakthrough was breeding more critical attitudes to entrism. 
Frictions between open work and undercover operations, working through an organisation 
hostile to Communism, were increasingly recognised and the quality of a party built this way 
increasingly questioned. In March 1938, Pollitt reiterated Dutt’s concerns. Recruitment to the 
CPGB was faltering. Pollitt blamed this on sympathisers who believed that joining the CPGB 
would hinder them in fighting for Communist policies in the Labour Party and trade unions. If 
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they were advised to belong to both parties, ‘you get called hypocritical … it gives an 
atmosphere of double dealing to the fellow you are putting this to. He has got already to be one 
hundred percent to be able to carry through that successfully.’74 Despite possibly two to three 
thousand members inside the Labour Party, many ‘become susceptible to the pressure and are 
not active as Communists’.75  
By 1939, the failure of the campaign for a Popular Front was underlined by the heavy 
vote against at Labour’s Conference.76 As Soviet foreign policy shifted, so did the CPGB’s 
always expedient and Comintern-contingent attitudes to Labour. The renewed application for 
affiliation in July had a formulaic feel and no hope of success, even before the Hitler-Stalin 
Pact was announced the following month.77 In June, Rust, charged by the PB with presenting a 
new policy toward entrism, had rehearsed to the CC the difficulties the party had 
experienced.78 While initially a productive stratagem, tensions had arisen between ‘concealed’ 
and ‘active, open’ members; there were also political costs: ‘the tendency is to pull strings 
instead of directly developing the political agitation … a tendency to replace the mass activity 
by the method of working through fractions’. Moreover, Transport House discounted 
resolutions from Labour organisations known to be penetrated by Communists. The CC 
therefore decided on ‘the withdrawal of comrades from the Labour Party, but with certain 
qualifications’ [emphasis added]. In consequence, there would be ‘a number of people coming 
into the Party openly with quite good names and reputations’ and this would be accompanied 
by appropriate publicity.  
 Two weeks later, the Daily Worker announced that Eric Gower, Labour’s prospective 
parliamentary candidate for Stretford and ‘actively associated with the campaign for a People’s 
Front’, had joined the CPGB, his conversion allegedly accomplished through reading The 
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History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, although suspicions of his Communist 
affiliation were longstanding. His defection was the first of many in the following months, 
including the secretaries of the Oxford, Rottingdean, Mitcham, Woking, South Kensington, 
Hammersmith, Old Oak and Putney Labour Parties, chairs of the Brixton, North Montscombe, 
Watford, Woking and Hollingsbury Labour Parties, the vice-president of Hornsey Labour 
Party, and numerous less prominent office-holders.79 Cripps lamented these ‘desertions’ and 
urged ‘all good socialists’ to remain inside Labour. The CPGB retorted that those joining the 
party could work more effectively for ‘working class unity by building a strong Communist 
Party’. It made no general appeal, it insisted, for workers unable to accept its full programme to 
abandon Labour: ‘On the contrary, the interests of the working class will best be served by 
such workers remaining within the Labour Party, supporting all progressive measures and 
fighting for working class unity.’80   
Tortuous phraseology helped obscure the fact that withdrawal was not total. 
Contradicting claims that entrism ended with the outbreak of war, renewed Communist activity 
was reported to the NEC by George Shepherd, National Agent, in December 1939; the 
committee encouraged him to take ‘all necessary disciplinary action’.81 Three months later, a 
memorandum to the NEC lamented the continued presence of members who followed ‘every 
line of the changing policy laid down by the Communist Party’.82 These members were not a 
residuum of individual ‘impetuous spirits’: that CPGB entrists remained organised was 
evidenced by a meeting of the Communist fraction inside the Labour Party convened by Gaster 
on the eve of Labour’s 1940 annual conference.83  
Nevertheless, the phased withdrawal of the CPGB’s cadres continued with 
accompanying fanfare. Between the outbreak of war in September 1939 and the banning of the 
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Daily Worker in January 1941, the paper reported that some 35 local Labour officials had 
resigned from the party in disgust at national policy, many of them declaring their intention to 
join the CPGB: in December 1939 alone, ten such resignations were announced.84 In addition, 
it was claimed in June 1940 that eighteen members of the general council of the North 
Kensington Labour Party had resigned since the start of the war, most transferring allegiance to 
the CPGB.85 We do not know how many were already clandestine Communists. Some may 
simply have been disillusioned Labour activists attracted to Communist policies. But we do 
know that some of those resigning to publicly ‘join’ the Communists were entrists, including 
George Matthews, Kenneth Campbell, Bill Rounce, Howard Hill and William Ross. The 
staggered nature of their withdrawal suggests it was carefully choreographed to provide 
maximum embarrassment to Labour and sustain the momentum of recruitment to the CPGB.86  
The Labour leadership continued to combat its enemy within. In July 1940, the NEC 
approved dissolution of Hammersmith Labour Party because of ‘disruptive activities’ and 
reported Sheffield Trades Council and Labour Party had been ‘re-organised on a basis of 
loyalty to the Labour Party’.87 In September, the Belper party was disaffiliated for supporting 
the National Vigilance Committee (NVC), ‘established by expelled members of the Labour 
Party with the backing of the Communist Party’.88 Labour’s Annual Report concluded that: 
‘Since the outbreak of War and the aggression of Russia against Poland and Finland, the 
Communist Party of Great Britain has intensified its underground work in certain sections of 
the Labour Party’ (Labour Party, 1940, p. 20). In the summer of 1940, the CPGB and the NVC 
had launched a campaign for a People’s Convention aimed at securing a ‘people’s peace’ and, 
despite the implacable hostility of the Labour leadership, had organised a well-attended 
conference in January 1941. Labour’s officials conducted a determined counter-offensive, 
 32 
interviewing dozens of members, requesting they withdraw support for the Convention: 132 
refused, including 20 members of the Reading party, and were expelled.89 Continuing anxiety 
over the opportunities for entrism offered by the ‘organisational decay’ induced by wartime 
disruption was such that the selection of prospective parliamentary candidates was suspended 
in October 1941 (Thorpe, 2014, p. 231). 
By then the CPGB’s bouleversement following the German invasion of Russia had 
transformed the situation. The People’s Convention was wound up and the focus shifted to 
building an Anglo-Soviet Unity movement. The Soviet Union’s new-found popularity led to 
rapid expansion of CPGB membership and growth of influence in the trade unions under 
conditions of full employment (Hinton, 1979, pp. 27–32; Croucher, 1982). When the CPGB 
launched a renewed campaign for Labour Party affiliation in 1943, the primary locus of its 
hopes lay in its new battalions in the unions rather than among any residual entrist cadres.90 
Although the proposition attracted 712,000 votes, the largest ever in favour of affiliation, it was 
rejected by 1,951,000 (Thorpe, 2014, pp. 234–238).   
 
Popular Front entrism: dimensions  
‘Communists have eaten far deeper into Local Labour Parties than is realised’, the Labour 
Organiser warned in 1936 (Drinkwater, 1936, p. 202). A subsequent Comintern review of the 
CPGB concurred: ‘With the goal of strengthening the campaign for unity within the Labour 
Party in the last year, many members of the Communist Party have secretly been sent for work 
in the internal local organs of the Labour Party.’91 From this and other reports, we have 
ascertained the number of such members for the five largest CPGB districts in November 1937 
and, using district membership data, the percentage of entrists in these localities. See Table 1. 
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These districts embraced eighty-three per cent of the party’s total membership.92 While there 
was significant variation between districts, the overall figure of ten per cent of Communists 
operating inside the Labour Party is derived from a large sample of the party. If we accept the 
suggestion that entrism was more prevalent in industrial backwaters, this may be a slight 
underestimate. In the small CPGB branch in York in 1937, most of the ten members were also 
members of the Labour Party, while in Harrogate all eight members were in the Labour Party.93 
In Jarrow, an industrial town but in a region where the CPGB was exceptionally weak, five out 
of the seven Communists were reported to hold Labour Party cards (Wilkinson, 1939, p.194).  
Table 1. CPGB members in the Labour Party, 1937 
 
 
CPGB District Number of 
covert CPGB 
members 







London 450 6,500 6.9 
Scotland 150 2,330 6.4 
Lancashire 384 1,500 25.6 
South Wales 82 896 9.2 
North Midlands* 150 747 20.1 
Total for above 
districts 
1,216 11,973 10.2 
 
 
*Primarily covering South Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire. 
 
Sources: RGASPI, 495/74/37, Report on some of the fundamental tactical, organisational and 
cadre problems for the Communist Party of Great Britain, December 27, 1937; CPA, CI 16, 
Report on South Wales membership, PB, November 12, 1937. 
 
The total number of entrists indicated in Table 1 is broadly consistent with Rust’s claim 
that during 1938–9: ‘we have had somewhat more than a thousand of our members, 1500 at the 
present time, who are concealed members’ [of the Labour Party].94 It contrasts with higher 
estimates by academics that around twenty per cent of CPGB members worked inside Labour. 
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While 1500 entrists represented 8.5 per cent of CPGB membership in July 1939, it may be 
contrasted with Labour’s individual membership of 409,000 in that year.95 However, Labour’s 
members were distributed across the entire country. The crude total tells us nothing of the 
health of local Labour organisations. Nor should it obscure the disproportionate role energetic 
Communists might play, particularly given their geographical concentration in localities such 
as London and Lancashire. Burns noted: ‘in most of these [Labour] ward organisations the 
number of members is extremely small and the number of active members smaller still (in most 
cases smaller than the number of active members in our Party areas)’.96 Tenure by Communists 
of elected positions as Labour representatives confirmed this. In 1937 Bramley reflected that in 
London: ‘We have eight members of the Council now and are nearly in a position to double 
our number. We have members of the E.C. of the Labour Party.’97 The following year, CC 
member Idris Cox claimed: ‘we have inside the Labour Party 32 Communists who are 
Councillors in London and Labour Party MPs and others’.98  
Further examples of Communists who were Labour councillors or leading activists in 
local Labour parties are provided in Table 2 below. This tabulates information about fifty-five 
CPGB members or sympathisers who were simultaneously members of the Labour Party. This 
sample is illustrative, not representative, drawn in an ad hoc manner from a range of sources. 
Nevertheless, our data questions the character of entrism posited in earlier literature. While a 
handful operated in non-industrial counties, the majority were active in cities or industrial 
areas. Only Horace Green, and perhaps Malcolm MacEwen, fitted the template of a 
Communist joining Labour because of geographical isolation from other members of the party. 
In the context of the primary materials’ repeated insistence on concealment, the only claims 
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that it was unnecessary remain those of Mitchell and Westacott – two out of fifty-five entrists 
in our sample (see Table 2, below).  
Although twelve entrists for whom occupational information is available were middle-
class, twenty-six were manual workers and twelve were in clerical or white-collar employment. 
Only one was a student, a group whose mobility, it has been conjectured, facilitated 
concealment, while two (Milner and MacEwen) had become Communists at university. 
Subterfuge was indispensable for some manual workers, such as Dave Priscott, an apprentice 
in Portsmouth Naval Dockyard where CPGB membership could lead to dismissal. Reed 
Jenkins demonstrated that even in the closely-knit mining communities of South Wales, 
Communists could successfully operate undercover. That twenty of those listed remained 
Labour Party members after 1939 confirms the qualified nature of the CPGB’s withdrawal that 
year. 
Even allowing for the small-scale, unrepresentative nature of the sample in Table 2, and 
the problems of ascertaining precise dates of recruitment, it is notable that seventeen were 
CPGB members who infiltrated the Labour Party, compared with twenty-nine who were 
recruited to the CPGB when already Labour members. Of the seventeen, the data is sufficient 
to show that five had been Communists for two years or more before they entered the Labour 
Party while four had been Communists for up to one year. Only one of these four, Jim Foulds, 
unequivocally joined both parties simultaneously: ‘the comrades suggested I should join the 





Stalinist entrism: protagonists 
It is difficult to classify Labour Party activists working for the CPGB with precision. Given the 
secrecy which shrouded the enterprise, categorisation can only be rough, boundaries between 
groups are approximate and classification has to acknowledge fluidity and internal 
differentiation. We can largely, although not completely, exclude the popular front fellow-
travellers anatomised by David Caute (1988, pp. 166–174) from the entrist paradigm. The 
majority neither espoused the CPGB’s programmatic politics nor acted under its discipline; 
they differed from most Labour activists in their attitude to the Soviet Union and/or 
determination to collaborate with the Communists in the fight against fascism. However, some 
had a closer, if still ambiguous, relationship with the CPGB. For example, Dorothy Woodman, 
forced to resign from the chair of a proscribed CPGB front by Labour’s NEC, was described by 
MI5 as a ‘near communist’;100 dismissed by Cripps from the editorship of the erstwhile 
popular-frontist Tribune in 1940 for continuing to plough a Stalinist furrow, H.M. Hartshorn is 
variously designated a ‘fellow-traveller’ (Caute, 1988, p. 168), ‘a near Communist’ (K.O. 
Morgan, 2007, p. 64) or ‘a secret member of the CP’ (Anderson & Davey, 2013, p. 859). There 
is continuing controversy over whether John Strachey, classified in the past as ‘a fellow 
traveller strictly adhering to the party line’ (Wood, 1959, p. 43) may have been for a time a 
card-carrying Communist.101 Characterised by one historian as somebody who ‘should 
probably be counted with the communists in all but name’ (Morgan, 2009), D.N. Pritt himself 
described membership as ‘a technical matter’, a judgement which certainly applied to his own 
case.102 
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Caute (1988, p. 173) similarly countenanced against fetishizing possession of a party 
card and Jack Cutter, the anti-Communist columnist of the Labour Organiser, claimed each 
entrist fraction contained ‘ordinary’ and ‘party’ members: 
‘Ordinary’ members are Union or Labour Party delegates who are prepared to  
put the CP case and use CP tactics in the organisations to which they are delegated. 
To comply with LP and TUC rules they do not take out CP membership cards, but 
seasoned members of the CP attend their meetings to act as ‘guides’ (Cutter, 1940b, p. 
55). 
‘Ordinary’ members were ‘to all intents and purposes’ members of the CPGB, ‘and in close 
cahoots with that organisation’. Cutter observed of the underground operative: 
He does not possess a CP membership card, and if he made formal application  
for CP membership he would probably be refused because he is doing much  
more valuable work for them inside the Labour Party. The Americans have a  
word for this kind of under-cover man. They would call him a stool pigeon (Cutter, 
1940a, p. 26).  
Cutter may have over-generalised – as we have seen, CPGB activists were, at times, 
under pressure from their leaders to recruit sympathetic Labour activists into the CPGB and 
some secret members had CPGB cards held by party officials. Whatever the formal position, it 
is clear from autobiographical accounts that, card or no card, ‘ordinary’ members acted as 
CPGB members. On that basis, and allowing for diversity, entrists may be broadly and 
provisionally grouped into three categories: classic entrists (Communists infiltrating the 
Labour Party); recruited entrists (Labour Party members who joined the CPGB but remained 
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active on its behalf inside Labour); and non-card-carrying Communists (Labour Party 
members who did not formally join the CPGB but strictly adhered to its line). 
The organisers of entrism should not be overlooked. The tactic was driven from the top 
by the Comintern and Pollitt. But as we have seen, the CC and district functionaries were 
involved; indeed, it is implausible that conscientious activists remained unaware of the policy. 
Bramley and Gaster directed operations and were well-fitted to that role. An engineering trade 
unionist, Bramley had been active in the Labour Party in the 1920s. He himself had been 
recruited to the CPGB in 1927 by Communists who had evaded expulsion and was familiar 
with clandestine technique. A CC member who had attended the 13th Plenum of the Comintern 
Executive in Moscow in 1933, he held a pivotal position as London Organiser. From a 
bourgeois Jewish background, Gaster brought a lawyer’s skills to subversion. He had known 
Bramley in Westminster Labour Party in the 1920s and joined the CPGB from the ILP where 
he had become well-versed in the world of factionalism and Communist entrism (Cohen, 2001, 
pp. 190–209).103 
Douglas Hyde exemplifies the first category of entrist. When he moved to Woking in 
1938, he adopted ‘the familiar communist infiltration methods’ in the local Labour Party. After 
his first meeting he engaged ‘keen young members’ in discussion:  
I noted the most hopeful and sat with them at the next meeting … Two or three  
weeks later I got the first of them into the Party, telling them to keep quiet about  
his membership and to continue to work in the Labour Party. Then another,  
another and another … When the Constituency Party’s Annual General Meeting  
came round we decided in advance whom to support … The group captured a  
majority of the positions and was soon doing most of the work of the Labour  
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Party in the district. (Hyde, 1950, pp.64–65).  
Gathering his recruits together, Hyde revealed the strength of the CPGB caucus and launched a 
Labour Party newspaper which disseminated the CPGB line. When the CPGB leadership 
decided that ‘most of the undercover members in the Labour Party should come out into the 
open’ almost the entire group resigned, severely disrupting Labour organisation in the district.  
(Hyde, 1950, p.66). Although Hyde wrote as a critical ex-Communist, his recollections are 
supported by the Daily Worker which reported in July 1939 that the chairman, vice-chairman, 
secretary and a committee member of Woking Labour Party had resigned to join the CPGB.104  
 Tom Murray was another successful infiltrator. He had been an ILP and Labour Party 
member from 1919 before joining the CPGB in Edinburgh in 1930. At some point he became 
involved in what he described as the party’s ‘policy of clandestine underground activity’ and 
joined the Labour Party. By 1936 he was a Labour councillor, supported in his campaign by 
Communists who ‘were subterranean like me’ (MacDougall, 2000, p. 292).105 He recalled three 
other councillors who were secret CPGB members. Jack Kane claimed only a brief, nominal 
membership. The two others, David Chalmers and George Boath, elected in 1938 and 1939 
respectively, came out openly as Communists by 1940 and served as CPGB councillors until 
after the war (MacDougall, 2000, pp. 294–5, 537–8, nn. 259, 261). Murray, by then secretary 
of the Labour group as well as prospective parliamentary candidate for North Midlothian, 
made no similar admission and continued to play a leading role among Labour councillors.   
 Murray’s career is testimony to the difficulties Labour faced in identifying and 
removing entrists. His ability was suggested following the outbreak of war when the CP 
appointed him to lead a small group in Scotland charged with preparing for illegality: ‘reliable 
comrades who would cease to be prominent in open party activities, and indeed who would 
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preferably appear to be renegades from Party organisation ... in no circumstances were they to 
be seen reading the Daily Worker ...’ (MacDougall, 2000, pp. 274–275). Despite such 
precautions, Labour officials had grounds for suspecting his political sympathies. Murray had 
been secretary of the Scottish branch of the Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet 
Union and twice visited Russia; he led the Scottish delegation to the International Peace 
Congress in Brussels in 1936; was a commissar in the International Brigade in Spain between 
April and August 1938; and served on the Presidium of the International Conference on 
Refugees in Paris in 1939. The same year he attended the Conference of Petition Committees 
protesting against the expulsions of supporters of Cripps.106 While many suspected Murray and 
his fellow ‘subterraneans’ were ‘very close to the Communist Party if not actually members … 
they couldn’t prove anything’ (MacDougall, 2000, p. 294).  
Appointed Scottish secretary of the Fire Brigades Union in 1939, Murray became 
president of Edinburgh Trades and Labour Council in 1941. He subsequently claimed pressure 
of union work led him to resign his parliamentary candidature in 1940 and his council seat in 
1942. Although Woodburn had prevented Murray from securing parliamentary nomination in 
Dundee, he was unable to repeat this in Midlothian where Murray had strong support. 
However, following an interview with Labour’s Scottish Executive concerning his ‘attitude to 
Party policy’, he agreed to withdraw his candidature.107 His politics provoked his removal as 
Trades Council president in 1943 following a vote of no confidence, critics accusing him of 
using his office to assist the Communist Party. Murray stood for the town council as a 
Communist candidate in 1946. Although his election report claimed that Labour Party 
organisation in the ward had been ‘developed by the C.P.’, he came bottom of the poll.108 
Disillusioned with what he termed the CPGB’s ‘desertion of the infallible guiding principles of 
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Marxism-Leninism’, he resigned in 1965 to become a Maoist.109 His retrospective evaluation 
of his ‘infiltration and clandestine activity was that it was a failure …because people just don’t 
tolerate that sort of thing after a certain experience of it’ (MacDougall, 2000, p. 292). 
Many Labour activists recruited to the CPGB continued working inside the Labour 
Party. Lawrence Kirwan, a journalist, joined Labour in 1931 aged 21.110 Largely inactive, he 
had been galvanised by the failure of the Vienna revolt in 1934 and had switched to the 
Chiswick branch of the CPGB, moving the following year to Enfield where there were only 
four other party members: 
The five of us linked up and recruited most of an active group of Socialist Leaguers and 
we soon had a functioning branch … All this time I had retained my Labour Party 
membership. I joined the Enfield Chase Ward Labour Party and quickly was elected 
Secretary and a delegate to the Divisional General Council. Soon almost half our then 
small membership was in influential positions in the LP there.  
Kirwan stood unsuccessfully as a Labour council candidate in 1938. The following year, in 
conformity with CPGB instructions, he announced his disagreements with Labour policy and 
that he ‘was going over to the CP (of which of course [he] was already an active member)’.  
 Like London, Manchester was a stronghold of entrism and Jack Owen one of the most 
effective of those who operated inside the Labour Party after his recruitment to the CPGB in 
1936. A veteran of the SDF, Owen lent authenticity and tradition to entrism. He had 
participated in the 1909 Ruskin College strike, graduating to work in the Plebs League and the 
pre-1914 syndicalist upsurge, as well as the wartime shop stewards’ movement. He was 
particularly useful as he combined activity in the Amalgamated Engineering Union with his 
undercover endeavours in the Labour Party where he became a Labour councillor and vice-
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chair of the Manchester City Labour Party. Like many entrists, Owen came out in 1940 when 
he was expelled for chairing a Daily Worker rally. He became a member of the editorial board 
and subsequently the full-time staff of the Communist newspaper.111 
 Frank Truefitt, from a left-wing, republican family in Salford, had joined the LLOY 
aged 19 in 1931.112 Two years later he was recruited to the ‘YCL [Young Communist League] 
fraction’ and underwent ‘quick development’, becoming Chairman of the Salford LLOY and 
attending three national conferences. He joined the CPGB in 1937 and progressed to covert 
work inside the adult Labour Party, although, echoing the concerns of the CPGB leadership, he 
recalled he initially displayed ‘tendencies to carry Labour Party background into Party work’. 
Truefitt was elevated to command of the CPGB’s Labour Party fraction in Salford and thus 
represented a significant asset: the ‘decision to withdraw me from LP was slow, as it was 
thought advisable I remained in after the Munich crisis’ (of September 1938). His selection for 
‘special work’ on the outbreak of war – in similar fashion to Murray and Hyde, who was 
placed in charge of CP underground activity nationally in 1939 – bespoke skills developed as 
an entrist. His political reliability was underlined by his appointment to the CP’s Cadre 
Commission in 1942.    
The journalist Charlotte Haldane, was a Labour Party member of many years standing 
when she was recruited to the Communist Party. A secret member of the CPGB under ‘Party 
discipline’ from 1937, she followed Pollitt’s personal instruction in 1939 to attend meetings of 
the South-West St Pancras Labour Party: ‘It was a small group, but even here there was a 
strong Party fraction, of which, of course I was a member also. In due course the fraction got 
my nomination to the Borough Council. I became a member of the Labour Group on the 
council on January 17th 1940’ (Haldane, 1949, pp. 238, 182; see also Adamson, 1998, pp. 97, 
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137). This corroborates the qualified nature of the CPGB’s ‘withdrawal’ from entrism in 1939. 
Haldane was eventually expelled from Labour for supporting the People’s Convention and, 
disillusioned with Stalinism following service as a war correspondent in Russia, resigned from 
the CPGB in 1941.113 
The intricacies of entrism and the complexities of classifying entrists are apparent from 
the case of Malcolm MacEwen who may be viewed as a recruited entrist or a non-card-
carrying Communist. He joined Labour at Edinburgh University in the mid-1930s but soon 
became associated with the YCL.114 To all intents and purposes, he was a Communist when he 
enrolled in the Labour Party in Inverness in 1937. He retrospectively explained this decision on 
the grounds that the CPGB mustered only two members in an area unprepossessing for 
Communists and his apprehension of the adverse impact open affiliation to the CPGB might 
have on his family’s law firm. Nonetheless, there was an expectation that in these 
circumstances Communists would enter Labour. Although MacEwen described himself as a 
fellow-traveller, he religiously read the Daily Worker and faithfully followed the CPGB line, 
being elected a Labour councillor and adopted as prospective parliamentary candidate for Ross 
and Cromarty. The Hitler-Stalin pact failed to shake his faith and his resignation from the 
Labour Party over its condemnation of the Soviet attack on Finland confirmed his 
Communism. He worked for the Daily Worker, supported the People’s Convention and stood 
as what he termed ‘the Crypto-Communist Candidate’ in the East Dunbartonshire by-election 
in 1941. On his own account, CPGB leaders assumed MacEwen was a member, although it 
was only when appointed a CPGB organiser that ‘I then got my Party card’.115 
The barrister D.N. Pritt was perhaps the most prominent non-card-carrying Communist. 
Converted to Stalinism following a visit to Russia in 1932, and quickly utilised as chair of the 
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legal commission established by the World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism into 
the Reichstag fire, Pritt was elected Labour MP for Hammersmith North in 1935 and a member 
of the NEC in 1936. He was initially cautious in his public dealings with the CPGB. Invited by 
Springhall to an ‘open conference’ organised by the party in 1935, Pritt declined, explaining 
that he was already suspected of collaboration: ‘I have to be particularly careful to do nothing 
to jeopardise my chances of doing useful work in the future.’116 His utility was demonstrated 
by his apologia for the Moscow trials. His attendance at Zinoviev’s trial in 1936 was secured 
by Arnot with difficulty, but the CPGB representative in Moscow concluded that ‘when he gets 
back … it ought to be thoroughly useful’.117 Pritt’s book endorsing the proceedings realised 
Arnot’s expectations. Expelled from Labour for supporting the Soviet invasion of Finland, Pritt 
became treasurer of the People’s Vigilance Committee and a frequent speaker on CPGB 
platforms where he deployed his non-membership of the party to legitimise his pro-Soviet 
views.118 In private, he came close to joining the party on several occasions but does not appear 
to have done so.119 While not a formal member, the Security Service judged that ‘in every 
other respect he is an ardent Communist’.120  
Pritt’s value was underlined by his involvement with another apparent ‘non-card 
carrier’, Wilfred Vernon, a technician at the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE). An active 
member of the Farnborough and Cove Labour Party, police surveillance concluded he was 
‘closely connected’ with CPGB headquarters, Hampshire’s Chief Constable labelling him ‘a 
fanatical communist’ who distributed the Daily Worker to his workmates.121 A Special Branch 
informant alleged that Vernon, along with an aeronautical engineer and fellow Labour Party 
activist, Frederick Meredith, were members of ‘an active and dangerous Communist cell at 
RAE’.122 Although he distributed CPGB literature, propounded Communist policies and 
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organised meetings for a variety of leftwing causes, Vernon emphasised the importance of 
discretion: ‘It is very necessary to be careful how we go about things and not to run into 
trouble unnecessarily. We must choose our jobs. I, being a civil servant, have to be particularly 
cautious’.123 Although both men were justifiably suspected of Communist sympathies – 
Meredith had signed a letter to the Daily Worker office ‘Yours sympathetically’ – there was no 
hard evidence that they were CPGB members.124 According to a moderate official of the local 
Labour Party, ‘Meredith is 100% [Communist] but has not openly stated so before the 
[Labour] Party, so cannot be expelled; Vernon runs him very close … I have tried all along to 
keep the Party clean Labour, but not always successfully I am afraid’.125 
Following a burglary at his home, Vernon’s notes on classified documents were 
discovered among stolen papers. Charged under the Official Secrets Act, he was defended by 
Pritt, who emphasised the ‘difference between this case and one of spying’. Pritt insisted there 
was ‘no hint’ of his client making ‘improper’ use of the information and, denying Vernon’s 
Communist connections, protested: ‘There was not a single word of truth in that.’126 Fined and 
dismissed from the RAE, Vernon alleged political victimisation, strenuously denying he was a 
Communist.127 Sympathisers established a ‘Vernon Defence Fund’ and his local Labour Party 
petitioned the NEC. Sentence was pronounced the day the NEC met and the committee agreed 
that Pritt (an NEC member) should discuss matters with the chair.128 Pritt’s successful 
advocacy permitted Vernon’s adoption as a prospective parliamentary candidate in 1938 and 
he was elected Labour MP for Dulwich in 1945.     
The involvement of Vernon and Meredith in Soviet espionage was only revealed after 
the war, following the discovery of Gestapo files in Paris relating to a Soviet spy ring (West, 
2005, pp. 228–235). That Pritt’s defence had been disingenuous was suggested by Meredith’s 
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assurance that Vernon had told Pritt ‘the whole story of his espionage connections’.129 
Meredith confessed he had spied to MI5 interrogators in 1949. Vernon was not questioned 
until 1952, having lost his seat in the 1951 election. He admitted espionage but denied CPGB 
membership.130 His denial cannot be accepted uncritically since he was then a Labour county 
councillor and parliamentary candidate, but, given it was normal for Soviet agents to distance 
themselves from local Communist parties, it remains plausible. In 1939, an MI5 informant 
reported meeting Vernon who, he claimed, was ‘working up the Labour Party and CP at EAST 
DULWICH … Says CP latest instructions are that – all Communists are to leave the weak-
kneed Labour Party and concentrate on building the CP. Some areas are to work openly. Others 
– like Aldershot – are to build up secret Parties.’131 If Vernon did not carry a card, he was at 
least well informed on current party policy.  
 
 
A normal British party? 
This paper has reconstructed an under-researched aspect of political history and extended and 
clarified the existing historiography. Communist entrism, a specific, often overlooked, variety 
of the species, was on a smaller scale than some historians have estimated. Nevertheless, by 
1937 around 10 per cent of CPGB members were operating inside the Labour Party and some 
held office. Entrism commenced earlier and concluded later than has been assumed. 
Exploratory moves were in train in 1933, coinciding with the CPGB’s initial united front 
overtures to Labour Party leaders. Entrism was prosecuted from 1934, and thereafter with 
mounting vigour. It functioned as a significant adjunct to successive campaigns for Communist 
affiliation to facilitate a Popular Front. Our findings question the perception in the literature 
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that sustained entrism began in 1937 and was abandoned after 1939. Assets remained in place 
until the downturn in Labour activity and dissolution of the Comintern in 1943. 
 Biographical data validates party documents: like later entrism, the Communist variant 
involved infiltration of CPGB members to stimulate the defection of Labour Party members 
and organise their retention as secret Communists or collaborators who augmented the process 
of winning recruits to Communism and influencing Labour Party policy. Largely absent from 
existing accounts of the period, entrism constituted a significant aspect of Communist strategy. 
Its character, secrecy and limited demands contrast with the relative openness and socialist 
programme of the NLWM. It raises questions about the degree to which Popular Front 
sentiment inside the Labour Party was organic or artificially stimulated and casts new light on 
the relationship between the CPGB and the Labour left. To present entrism as a semi-
spontaneous alignment of ideals and goals, across porous political boundaries between 
Communist and Labour activists, is to diminish the element of organised agency apparent from 
the primary materials; minimise the borders between the two parties; and dissolve the secrecy 
and subversion intrinsic to the tactic. What was involved was, as Pollitt conceded, ‘a question 
of the Trojan Horse’.132 
The Stalinist entrism of the 1930s has some claims to be considered the major modern 
essay in covert factional activity based on infiltration of a mass party. It is, moreover, 
important to situate the episode in its broader context. From one vantage point, the CPGB was 
a conventional British party, an image it strenuously cultivated in the Popular Front years; 
from another, it was a Russian-directed and financed, conspiratorial organisation, a reality it 
sought to suppress in these years. Consideration of entrism confirms that secrecy and double-
dealing was integral to the CPGB’s modus operandi, as much part of British Communism as 
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campaigning for arms for Spain, mobilisation against the Blackshirts, struggles for higher 
wages and union democracy – or adulation of Stalin. There was a unity between the ‘normal’ 
facets of British Communism and its identity as a conspiratorial avatar of Soviet policy. The 
latter, as the Comintern archives substantiate, directed and infused the former. In any attempt at 
holistic history, both aspects demand attention; neither should be disregarded. A small vignette 
illuminates the way in which the different worlds of Russo-British Communism were 
connected. In early 1943, Pollitt reported to Dimitrov via the NKVD intelligence network on 
what he considered the successful progress of the CPGB’s latest affiliation campaign, 
intimately related to the entrist project.133 Not to be outdone, Pavel Fitin, Head of the NKVD 
Foreign Department, countered that his resident station chief in London had taken time out 
from supervising British Communists spying for Russia to assess the affiliation campaign with 
his own practised eye. Fitin concluded that Pollitt’s estimation did not ‘correspond to reality’ 
(Firsov, Klehr & Haynes, 2014, p. 191). 
Yet some academics who focus on the ‘normal’, ‘British’ features suggest that scholars 
who focus on ‘the secret world’ are ‘fixated’ on it.134 In contrast, the eminent historian and 
former Communist, Dorothy Thompson, reasserted its significance, both for political and 
social historians: ‘“undercover” work formed a part at least of the political lives of many 
comrades, among them the most committed party members. They were part of the “front” 
activity and should perhaps show up somewhere in the social history of the CP membership’ 
(Thompson, n.d., p. 4).  
Latter-day Communists admitted the CPGB maintained a list of secret members, not for 
nefarious reasons but to protect civil servants, teachers and others in similar employment who 
feared victimisation because of their party membership (Griffiths, 2008). This overlooks the 
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denial of party membership and resort to subterfuge of Communists operating in voluntary 
institutions, from the trade unions through the Union of Democratic Control and the League of 
Nations Union, and a plethora of student and youth organisations, to the National Council of 
Labour Colleges, the ILP and, of course, the Labour Party. Converts to Communism embraced 
duplicity with a vengeance. In the light of other evidence, there seems little need to question 
the recollections of Oxford University in the late 1930s of the then Communist, Robert 
Conquest: ‘Nearly all the committee of the Labour Club, with over 1,000 members, and all the 
committees of the League of Nations Union, Liberal Club and Student Christian Movement, 
together with two of the five Conservative Club committee were also in the CP. So, 
extraordinary as it seems, were two even of the ten British Union of Fascists!’ (Conradi, 2009, 
p.82).135 Together with its subordination to the Comintern, the Soviet state and bureaucratic 
centralism, entrism stamped the CPGB as far from a ‘normal’ British party.  
Yet entrism produced problems. There were tensions between building a centralist 
party which proclaimed itself the vanguard of the working class, and marshalling members to 
construct an undercover caucus inside a competitor with a fundamentally antagonistic, 
organisation, politics and culture. The contradictions even posed a kind of premature 
Browderism, the unintended, existential issue of dissolving the CPGB. There were conflicts 
between ‘open Communists’ and ‘subterraneans’, anxieties about the quality of Labour Party 
recruits and difficulties in organising and executing a changing line while evading detection. 
Some entrists became inactive; others felt the pull of the politics they simulated. And it was not 
only Labour’s leaders but many members who did not take kindly to deception. In the end, an 
intriguing enterprise in which the Comintern in Moscow mounted a covert operation to 
systematically subvert what was, in contradistinction to the CPGB, a very British party 
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foundered on the antipathy to Communism and suspicion of its methods that the majority of 
Labour Party activists shared with their leaders.   
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Table 2.  A sample of Communist entrists in the Labour Party and Labour League of Youth* 
  
Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
Sam Apter  n/a  Classic   1938 (1932) n/a  1939?  Sec., of LP Ward; 
(1917–?) London            Mgt Ctee, Mile-End LP 
1938–39 
Robert Barnes  Teacher  Classic  1934  1935  1938     ex-ILP member; ‘worked in West Ham 
(1911–?) London               Labour Party’, 1935–38.** 
 
Kay Birbeck  Telephonist Recruited 1938  1936  1940     Worked in ‘LP fraction’ Enfield, 1937– 
(1901–?) London               1940. 
 
George Boath  Lift engineer Classic  pre-1936 pre-1936 1940  LP councillor, 1939 Continued to sit as CPGB councillor 
(n/a) Edinburgh               until 1946.  
 
Dave Bowman  Railwayman Recruited 1940  c.1935  1941  Municipal election Expelled from LP Feb. 1941 for    
(1913–96) Dundee           Agent, Dundee  supporting People’s Convention. 
 
P. J. Broomfield  Printer  Recruited 1939  pre-1938 1940  EC of DLP;  Left LP when forced to leave district 
(n/a) Somerset            LP Councillor, Chilton following victimisation.  
             RDC, 1938–40 
 
Bernard Buckman Businessman Recruited 1938  1931  1939  Propaganda Sec.,  ‘I first joined the Party in 1938, although  
(1910–?) London            Hampstead LP  in 1937, under the instructions of [the  
                local CPGB secretary] I worked in the 
                Labour Party … Under [CPGB]  
                guidance I worked with the Labour Party  
                and became propaganda Secretary. I  
                began open air meetings and did many  
                meetings jointly with our Party. I  
                became May Day organiser for the  
                Hampstead Labour Party and was their  
                delegate to the China Campaign  
                Committee.’ 
 
Kenneth John Campbell Architect Recruited? 1930s  1938  1939     In charge of Miners’ Welfare 
 (1909–2002) Welwyn               Commission, West Midlands. 
         Garden City 
 
David Chalmers Industrial Classic  pre-1936 pre-1936 1940  LP councillor, 1938 Continued to sit as CPGB 




Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
            
Frederick Dickenson Engineer Recruited 1936  1935  1940?  Divisional Labour Party Sec., Gillingham TC, 1939; active in  
(n/a) Gillingham, Kent              People’s Convention movement. 
 
Dorothy Edwards  Typist  Non-Card 1939  Mid-1930s 1939  In charge of Rusholme  ‘For some time I was the Social 
(1912–?) Manchester           LLOY   Secretary for the [Manchester] Anti-War 
                Council … The Communist explanation  
of the causes of war seemed to me the  
only logical one and I became a Daily  
Worker reader … The Anti-War Council  
was campaigning for affiliations from  
the LP … and it was agreed that a  
number of individual members should  
join the LP. I joined the Rusholme  
Division … where the leftwing was quite  
strong and we fought continuous battles 
for a united working class movement,  
against non-intervention in Spain etc.’ 
 
Dick Etheridge  Shop assistant Classic  1929  1929  1939  Sec., Halesowen LP; ‘Joined the Party in 1929. Was  
(1909–85) Halesowen           Del. to DLP; LP  instructed to work in the LP.’ 
             Municipal candidate 
 
Reuben Falber  Hairdresser Recruited 1937  1935  1937     ‘In the Labour Party I worked with other  
(1914–2006) London              left-wing people and regularly sold Party  
literature at the ward meetings.’ On  
recruitment to the CP ‘I was told not to  
leave the Labour Party … Unfortunately  
I took the law into my own hands and  
resigned from the Labour Party and was  
sharply rebuked by the Party branch  
                secretary.’ 
 
Jim Foulds  Unemployed Classic  1938  1938  1939  Elected Chair of LP ‘Rather strangely, it appeared to me at  
(n/a) Colne            Ward at first meeting the time, the comrades suggested I  
                should join the Labour Party at the same  
time [as I joined the CPGB] … By July  
[1939] it was decided I should resign  




Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
 
Sally Freedman  n/a  Classic  1928 (1924) pre-1935 n/a  Sec., Holborn Anti- ‘In 1935 started on a special assignment 
(n/a) London            Fascist League; Holborn that lasted two years’; trained as a CPGB  
             LP   radio operator in Moscow, code name  
                SILVIA. 
 
Eric Gower  Trade union Non-Card or 1939  pre-1926 1939  Sec., Manchester LP,  Removed as Chair of Manchester LP 
(1903–?) Manchester official  Recruited?       1926–31; PPC; Chair, for Communist associations; resigned. 
             Manchester LP, 1937 LP to join CPGB 1939. 
 
Horace Green  Boot repairer Non-Card 1938  1924/1936 1935/1940 Sec., Brierley LP; Left ILP 1935; rejoined LP 1936 as a 
(1907–?) South Yorks           Del., DLP; LP  ‘fellow traveller’; joined CP in 1938,  
             Municipal Candidate ‘whilst.remaining in local Labour 
                Party, I developed a Left Book Club  
                Group, from that a Labour Monthly  
                Discussion Group, and eventually  
                recruitment in the locality gave us the  
                basis for a [CPGB] branch … in 1940.’ 
              
Peter Grimshaw  Engineer Recruited 1937  1933  1938  EC of DLP;   Withdrawn from LP work ‘to lead 
(1914–?) Salford            former Sec., LLOY work of a new [CPGB] group’.  
 
John Griffiths Hospital  Recruited 1936  1931  1938  Vice-President, Sutton DLP  
(1913–?) Tunbridge Administrator 
 Wells 
 
Charlotte Haldane Journalist Recruited 1937   early 1930s? 1941  LP Councillor, 1940 Secretary, Dependents’ Aid Ctee; 
(1894–1969) London               Expelled from LP over support for  
People’s Convention; Left CPGB 1941.
     
 
Christine Harper Garment  Recruited 1935  ‘for many years 1939     ‘in 1935 being at that period undercover 
(1902–?) Cardiff worker      before joining the      was Secretary of the Penarth Trades and   
[Communist] Party’ Labour Council for seven years… 
represented the LP on all  
              committees such as Assistance Board,  
              Public Assistance, etc.’ Resigned LP and  






Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
 
A.G. Harris Railwayman Recruited 1936-7  1932  1938  EC of Local LP;  Sec., Reading branch of Socialist 
(1905–?) Reading              League, which he founded. 
 
Owen Heather Student  Recruited 1936  pre-1936 ?     Expelled from CPGB 1938 and joined  
(1918–?) Manchester               ILP but retained LP membership  
throughout. 
 
Mary Higgins Typist  Recruited 1940  1930/31  n/a  Sec., Failsworth LLOY Sec., Oldham CPGB; ‘I joined the 
(1914–95) Oldham              Communist Party in Oldham but still  
              felt that I could do better work inside 
              the Labour Party … I am still [1942] a  
              member of the Mossley LP and delegate  
              to the Mossley DLP’.  
 
Howard Hill Electrician Classic  1934-35  1930s  1940  LP Councillor, 1938–46 Required to resign from LP for chairing 
(1913-80) Sheffield              DW rally in May 1940; retained council  
Seat until 1946. Full-time Sheffield CP 
District Secretary from 1943.  
  
Stanley Hughes Miner  Recruited 1937  1930  1938  LP branch sec.;  ‘Joined the C.P. 1937 covered member 
(n/a) North Wales           LP candidate,  until I should come out openly I was  
           Parish Council  forced to resign from Wrexham TLC 
              with a letter of regret.’  
 
Douglas Hyde Dental   Classic  1928  1938  1938  Edited local LP paper News Editor, Daily Worker; left CPGB  
(1911–96)  technician            1948.  
London 
  
Reed Jenkins  Miner  Classic   1932  mid–1930s late-1930s    There was no Labour Party in Trelewis 
(1907-?)               … so I attended the Communist Branch  
South Wales           meeting in Bedlinog and advanced the  
           view that the main task in our area was  
           to get the re-election of this sympathetic  
           [to the CP] Labour man … I re- 
           formed in Trelewis the Labour Party.  
           After [the] election I again joined the 
 Communist Party but worked for a time  
under cover. When it was considered fit,  
I emerged into the open and assisted in  
the general activities of the Party. The  
LP is not functioning to any extent now. 
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Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
 
Lawrence Kirwan Journalist Recruited 1934  1931  1939  Sec., Ward LP; 
(1900–?) St Albans           Council candidate   
 
Albert Kitt Engineer Classic   1931  post-1931 pre-1943    ‘Worked inside the Labour Party … for  
(1898–?) Eccles              5 years under Party guidance’. 
 
Miriam Llewellyn Housewife Recruited n/a  n/a  n/a  Sec., LP Women’s ‘Moved to suburbs. Formed a section 
(1906–?) Neath            Section   LP there and this proved [Communist]  
                Party stronghold. Husband expelled  
from [Labour] party. I continued but  
found I had played out so joined openly  
the [Communist] Party’. 
 
Kay Loosen  Typist  Recruited 1934  pre-1934 n/a  Sec., Cuffley LP;  Sec., Aid Spain Ctee; when in LP paid 
(?–1997) St Albans           del. to St Albans DLP CPGB dues ‘to comrades in Enfield’. 
 
Harry Lubbock  Accountant Classic   1931/2  post-1932 pre-1939 Chair, Hampstead LP Chair, CPGB  
(1912–?) London            ‘with knowledge of  Commercial Branch. 
             Party Centre (pre-war)’ 
 
Malcolm McEwen Lawyer  Non-Card 1941 (1935) 1935  1940  LP County Councillor, Student Communist, 1935–7, but did not  
(1911–96) Inverness           1938–40; LP PPC join CPGB until 1941.   
 
Rena Maitland  Factory worker Classic   1937  1938  1939  Sec., Ward LP   Sec., Glasgow Peace Council; 
(1912–?) Glasgow              ‘during 1938 and 1939 worked only in 
                LP and trade unions’. 
  
 
George Matthews Farmer  Recruited 1938  1937  1939  LP PPC,   First elected to CPGB 
(1917–2005) Bedfordshire           Mid-Bedfordshire Central Committee, 1943. 
 
Frederick Meredith Aeronautical Non-Card n/a  Pre-1934 n/a  Leading activist in Scientific officer, RAE; from 1938 head 
(1895–?) Farnborough engineer          local LP   of physics at Smiths Aircraft  
                Instruments; in 1949 confessed to 
spying for Soviet Union 1936-39 but not 
                charged. 
 
Ralph Milner Barrister  Classic   1932  1934  1937  Prospective LP   Joined CPGB at Cambridge; 




Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
 
Tom Mitchell Foundry worker Classic  1936  1936  n/a  Secretary, Letchworth LP Later Secretary, CP SE Midlands  
(1915–?) Letchworth              District.  
 
Tom Murray  Temperance Classic   1930  1922  1943–45  LP Councillor;  Commissar, International Brigade; 
(1900–?) Edinburgh organiser         Sec., Labour Group; President, Edinburgh Trades and Labour 
      PPC, North Midlothian Council; later a Maoist. 
 
George ‘Myke’ Myson Dental  Recruited 1938  1937  1939     Active in Left Book Club Theatre Guild. 
(1903–?) Harrow technician+ 
 
James Oldbury  Train driver Recruited 1935  c.1932  1941     ‘Joined CP 1935 but was instructed to  
(1904–?) Warrington              still retain membership Labour Party.  
                About this time elected on to the EC of  
                TC, playing a prominent part until  
                expelled in 1941 for association with the  
                People’s Convention.’ 
 
Jack Owen  Engineer Recruited 1936  1920s?  1940  LP Councillor, Vice- Ex-SDF member involved in 
(1887–1957) Manchester           Chair, Manchester LP Ruskin College strike, Plebs 
League; expelled from LP for chairing 
               DW rally; immediately joined DW  
Editorial Committee and became  
regular DW columnist. 
 
George Pemberton  Butcher  Recruited 1933–4  1932  1938  Sec., Central   ‘recruited 20 party members from LP’. 
(1904–?) London           Wandsworth LP   
 
Dave Priscott  Apprentice Non-Card 1938  1934  1938  Del., DLP  Later secretary, Yorkshire District CP. 
(1919–1995) Portsmouth               
 
Denis Pritt  Barrister, MP Non-Card n/a  1919  1940  Labour MP, 1935–40 Expelled form LP 1940; independent 
(1887–1972) London              MP 1945–50.  
 
William Ross Steel worker Classic  1926  1937  1940  Labour councillor ; Having moved to Corby from 
(1901–?) Corby           Sec., Corby Trades Lanarkshire, joined LP after consulting 
           Council    CP District Secretary; later Birmingham 
 CP Organiser. 
 




Name/   Occupation Category Date joined  Date joined Date left  LP positions  Notes 
Locality     of entrist CP (or YCL) LP/LLOY LP 
 
Les Smith  Factory  Non-Card? 1938  1935  1938  LP Ward Sec.  ‘Finally decided I would have to join  
(1909–?) London  worker             CP if I wanted to fight for Unity, the  
                People’s Front , and the Spanish People.  
                On application was told to remain in  
                LP, but came out openly as a party  
                member the later end of 1938. A  
                number of others from the ward joined  
                the party with me.’  
                 
Frank Truefitt  Joiner  Recruited 1937 (1933) 1931  1938  Chair, Salford LLOY; ‘Was in charge of fraction work in LP in  
(1912–?) Salford            Sec., Salford LP  Salford up to or just previous to  
Munich’.  
 
Wilfred Vernon  Aeronautical Non-Card? n/a  pre-1934   PPC, 1938; MP,  Convicted for breach of Official Secrets 
(1882–1975)  draughtsman         1945–51; LP  Act, 1938; later confessed to  
            Councillor, post-1951 espionage on behalf of Soviet Union. 
 
William Ward  Clerk  Recruited 1939  1938  1941     ‘Worked simultaneously in the Party, the  
(1921–) Blackpool              [Young Communist] League and the  
                Labour Party, the local LLOY becoming  
                more or less defunct … This was the  
                position up to being called up in May  
1941’. Later CPGB organiser in Lancs 
and Cheshire. 
 
Fred Westacott  Fitter  Recruited 1937  1932/1935 1940  Sec. Local LP; delegate CP full-time worker South Wales,  
(1916–2001) Winchester           to CLP   1942. 
 
George Whomack Gun examiner Non-Card? pre-1927 pre-1934 n/a  LP candidate,   By mid-1930s, still attended CP 
(1883–?) Bexley            Bexley UDC, 1934 demonstrations and espoused CP 
                policy but was not known to be a CP 
                member. This may have been due to 
             his employment at Woolwich Arsenal  
             and his membership of a Soviet  
             espionage ring there, for which he was 
             convicted in 1938.    
 
Syd Wilkin  Factory  Recruited 1937  1935  1942  EC of local LP  ‘In 1937 I joined the CP although a  
(1908–89) Rotherham worker             member of the LP. I remained in the  
                LP until 1942.’    
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*Although the CPGB conducted extensive entrism inside the Labour League of Youth (LLOY) through its youth organisation, the Young Communist League (YCL), we have not 
included individuals who were solely involved in entrist activity in the LLOY. However, our sample includes some who initially joined the YCL or LLOY and progressed to entrism in 
the adult Labour Party.  
 
**Unless otherwise stated, quotations are from CPGB personal files. 
 
 
Sources: CPA, CP/CENT/PERS/1–8, Personal files; LPA, NEC Minutes; TNA, Security Service Files: Frederick William Meredith, KV2/2199, KV2/2202, D.N. Pritt, KV2/1062–
1065, W.F. Vernon, KV2/994–996, George Whomack, KV2/1237, E.D. Weiss, KV2/2230; Daily Worker, 1939–40; Stevenson, G. ‘Compendium of Communist Biographies’ retrieved 
at http://www.grahamstevevenson.me.uk/index; Flinn, A. (2005). ‘Labour’s family: Local Labour parties, trade unions and trades councils in cotton Lancashire, 1931–39’. In M. 
Worley (Ed.), Labour’s grass roots: Essays on the activities of local Labour parties and members, 1918–45 (p.117). Aldershot: Ashgate; Haldane, C. (1949). Truth will out. London: 
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Oram; ‘Dave Priscott’ (1984). In J. Attfield and S. Williams, (Eds.), 1939: The Communist Party of Great Britain and the war (pp. 100–102). London: Lawrence and Wishart; 
Weinbren, D. (1997). Generating socialism: Recollections of life in the Labour Party. Stroud: Sutton; West, N. (2005). MASK: MI5’s penetration of the Communist Party of Great 
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